The Snap IPO
• Company went public in March 2017.
• Each co-founder initially owned about 18% of the equity capital.
• However, although it was not transparent in the IPO documents, our analysis indicates that they will be able to reduce their stakes to less than 1.4% each and still retain control.
Facebook Reclassification
• In April 2016, Facebook passed a reclassification plan, approved by Zuckerberg's majority voting power .
• It would have enabled him to reduce his stake of equity capital to about 4% and possibly less, without losing his majority control.
• The plan was challenged at court, and in September 2017 Facebook decided not to proceed with it.
This Paper:
• Places a spotlight on a subset of dual-class structures in which the controller has a small (or even tiny) minority of equity capital
• These structures are especially pernicious and deserve special attention.
• We analyze the efficiency costs, drivers, incidence, and policy implications of small-minority controllers.
• Paper complements our earlier article: The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (Virginia Law Review 2017).
Small-Minority Controllers:
The Governance Problem
• Suppose that a controller:
• Owns a fraction α of the equity capital;
• Faces a choice whether to take a value-reducing action that would decrease value by ∆V, but provide a private benefit B.
• The controller would take the value-decreasing action if: ∆V < B / α.
Distortion Larger when Equity Stake Declines
• As α declines, the costs arising from situations in which ∆V < B / α are expected to increase because:
• the likelihood that the value-reducing action will take place increases; and
• the expected reduction in value in such a case increases.
• This prediction is consistent with substantial evidence that dual-class controllers with lower equity stakes are associated with lower value / greater agency problems (see, e.g., Gompers et al.; (2010) and Masulis et al. (2009) ).
The Severe Costs of Small Equity Stakes
• Moreover, we show (building on Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis (1999) ) that expected agency costs rise at an increasingly steep rate as α declines.
Example: initial V = $4 billion, B = $100 million:
• When a 30%-controller moves to 25%, the range of situations in which the controller would prefer to avoid a value-increasing action would increase from [∆V < $333 million] to [∆V < $400 M million].
• When a 10%-controller moves to 5%, the range would increase from [∆V< $1 billion] to [∆V< $2 billion].
Breadth of Distortions
The structural distortions we analyze afflict a wide array of settings and corporate decisions:
• Related party transactions;
• Allocation of opportunities and talents;
• Choice of CEO;
• Choice of business strategy;
• Scale and acquisitions decisions; and • Response to acquisition offers.
The Mechanisms of Extreme Separation (1)
We identify and analyze the mechanisms that enable controllers with a small-minority stake, and provide empirical evidence on their prevalence: (viii) Using the controller's power to make midstream governance changes that add or strengthen one or more of the above mechanisms.
The Mechanisms of Extreme Separation (3)
The example of Snap:
• Snap sold public investors nonvoting stock.
• However, the potential for massive reduction in controllers' equity stakes comes from the ~1.2 billion nonvoting shares that are authorized but unissued.
• Upon issuing pro rata dividends of these authorized nonvoting shares, the co-founders may sell without any diminution of their voting power.
• Each co-founder could sell 92% of their equity stakelowering it to less than 1.4% of the equity capitalwithout relinquishing control.
The Unfulfilled Promise of Existing Sunsets
• Current use of the ownership-based sunset provisions provides a weak and often nonexistent constraint on the mechanisms of extreme separation.
• In Snap, co-founders can go down to around 1.3% despite an ownership sunset. 
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Policy Implications (3)
Enhancing shareholder protections in companies with a small-minority controller. Such enhanced protections in companies with a smallminority controller could include:
• Applying heightened judicial scrutiny when the equity stake is smaller;
• Limiting the controller's power regarding some issues (e.g., changes in rules of the game);
• Eliminating the controlled-company exemption from independence requirements; and
• Introducing enhanced-independence requirements for directors (Bebchuk-Hamdani 2017).
